Abstract-This technical note studies a resilient control problem for discrete-time, linear time-invariant systems subject to state and input constraints. State measurements and control commands are transmitted over a communication network and could be corrupted by adversaries. In particular, we consider the replay attackers who maliciously repeat the messages sent from the operator to the actuator. We propose a variation of the receding-horizon control law to deal with the replay attacks and analyze the resulting system performance degradation. A class of competitive (resp. cooperative) resource allocation problems for resilient networked control systems is also investigated.
maliciously repeat transmitted data. In the context of multi-agent systems, the papers of [25] , [28] determine conditions under which consensus multi-agent systems can detect misbehaving agents. As for attack-resilient control, the papers [2] , [32] , [33] are devoted to studying deception attacks, where attackers intentionally modify measurements and control commands. Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks destroy the data availability in control systems and are tackled in recent papers [1] , [3] , [4] , [9] . More specifically, the papers [1] , [9] formulate finite-horizon LQG control problems as dynamic zero-sum games between the controller and the jammer. In [3] , the authors investigate the security independency in infinite-horizon LQG against DoS attacks, and fully characterize the equilibrium of the induced game. In our paper [35] , a distributed receding-horizon control law is proposed to ensure that vehicles reach the desired formation despite the DoS and replay attacks.
The problems of control and estimation over unreliable communication channels have received considerable attention over the last decade [12] . Key issues include band-limited channels [15] , [22] , quantization [6] , [21] , packet dropout [10] , [13] , [27] , delay [5] and sampling [23] . Receding-horizon networked control is studied in [7] , [11] , [24] for package dropouts and in [14] , [16] for transmission delays. Package dropouts and DoS attacks (resp. transmission delays and replay attacks) cause similar affects to control systems. So the existing recedinghorizon control approaches exhibit the robustness to certain classes of DoS and replay attacks under their respective assumptions. However, none of these papers characterizes the performance degradation of receding-horizon control induced by the communication unreliability.
Contributions: We study a variation of the receding-horizon control under the replay attacks. A set of sufficient conditions are provided to ensure asymptotical and exponential stability. More importantly, we derive a simple and explicit relation between the infinite-horizon cost and the computing and attacking horizons. By using such relation, we characterize a class of competitive (resp. cooperative) resource allocation problems for resilient networked control systems as convex games (resp. programs). The preliminary results are published in [33] where receding-horizon control is used to deal with a class of deception attacks. The complete version can be found in [36] .
II. ATTACK-RESILIENT RECEDING-HORIZON CONTROL

A. Description of the Controlled System
Consider the following discrete-time, linear time-invariant dynamic system: (1) where is the system state, and is the system input at time . The matrices and represent the state and the input matrix, respectively. States and inputs of system (1) are constrained to be in some sets; i.e., and , for all , where and . The quantities and are running state and input costs, respectively, for some and positive-definite and symmetric matrices. We assume the following holds for the system: Assumption 2.1: (Stabilizability): The pair is stabilizable. This assumption ensures the existence of such that the spectrum is strictly inside the unit circle where . In the remainder of the technical note, will be referred to as the auxiliary controller. We then impose the following condition on the constraint sets.
Assumption 2.2: (Constraint sets):
The sets and are convex and for .
B. The Closed-Loop System With the Replay Attacker
System (1) together with the sensor and the actuator are spatially separated from the operator. These entities are connected through communication channels. In the network, there is a replay attacker who maliciously repeats the messages delivered from the operator to the actuator. In particular, the adversary is associated with a memory whose state is denoted by . If a replay attack is launched at time , the adversary executes the following: (i) erases the data sent from the operator; (ii) sends previous data stored in her memory, , to the actuator; (iii) maintains the state of the memory; i.e., . In this case, we use to indicate the occurrence of a replay attack. If the attacker keeps idle at time , then data is intercepted, say , sent from the operator to plant, and stored in memory; i.e.,
. In this case, and is successfully received by the actuator. Without loss of any generality, we assume that . We now define the variable with initial state to indicate the consecutive number of the replay attacks. If , then ; otherwise, . So, the quantity represents the number of consecutive attacks up to time .
A replay attack requires spending certain amount of energy. We assume that the energy of the adversary is limited, and the adversary is only able to launch at most consecutive attacks. This assumption is formalized as follows:
Assumption 2.3: (Maximum number of consecutive attacks):
There is an integer such that . Replay attacks have been successfully used by the virus attack of Stuxnet [8] , [18] . This class of attacks can be easily detected by attaching a time stamp to each control command. In the remainder of the technical note, we assume that the attacks can always be detected and focus on the design and analysis of resilient controllers against them.
C. Attack-Resilient Receding-Horizon Control Law
Here we propose attack-resilient receding-horizon control law, (for short, AR-RHC), a variation of the receding-horizon control in; e.g. [16] , [17] , to deal with the replay attacks. AR-RHC is formally stated in Algorithm 1. In particular, at each time instant, the plant stores the computed control sequence which will be used in response to replay attacks in the near future. The terminal state cost is chosen to coincide with the running state cost. This is instrumental for analyzing the Lyapunov function in terms of the computing horizon and further the performance degradation in Theorem 2.1.
Algorithm 1 The attack-resilient receding-horizon control law
Initialization: The following steps are first performed by the operator:
1: Choose so that is strictly inside the unit circle.
2:
Choose and obtain by solving the following Lyapunov equation: (2) 3: Choose a constant such that . obtains the solution , and sends it to the actuator.
2: If
, the actuator receives , sets , implements , and the sensor sends to the operator. If , the actuator implements in , sets , and the sensor sends to the operator.
3: Repeat for .
In what follows, we present the results characterizing the stability and infinite-horizon cost induced by AR-RHC. See Table I , for the main notations employed. Notice that the following property holds:
where and are defined in Table I . On the other hand, for in Table I , as , and is strictly increasing in and upper bounded by . Then, given any integer , there is a smallest integer such that for all , it holds that Analogously, given any integer , there is a smallest integer such that for all , it holds that 
III. DISCUSSION AND SIMULATIONS
A. Extensions
AR-RHC with Theorem 2.1 can be readily extended to several scenarios, including DoS attacks, measurement attacks and the combinations of such attacks. If the adversary launches a DoS attack on control commands, the actuator receives nothing and then performs Step 3 in AR-RHC. The adversary may produce the replay attacks on the measurements sent from the sensor to the operator. If this happens, then the operator does not send anything to the actuator and the actuator performs Step 3 in AR-RHC.
B. Explicit Upper Bounds on and
Consider and let and . Note that (3) So it suffices to find such that . The relation is equivalent to the following:
Hence, an explicit upper bound on is . We now move to find an explicit upper bound on . Note that So, an explicit upper bound on is . This pair of upper bounds clearly demonstrate that a higher computational complexity; i.e., a larger , is caused by a larger , indicating that the adversary is less energy constrained. On the other hand, the second term in approaches a constant as goes to infinity. So can be upper bounded by an affine function. However, the second term in dominates when is large. So exponential stability demands a much higher cost than asymptotic stability when is large.
C. A Reverse Scenario
Reciprocally, for any horizon , there is a largest integer (resp. ) such that for all (resp. ), it holds that (resp. ). Theorem 2.1 still applies to this reverse scenario and characterizes the "security level" or "amount of resilience" that the proposed receding-horizon control algorithm possesses.
D. Optimal Resilience Management
The analysis of Theorem 2.1 quantifies the cost and constraints that allow the AR-RHC algorithm to work despite consecutive attacks under limited computation capabilities. These metrics can be used for optimal resilience management of a network as follows.
As [3] , we consider a set of players where the players share a communication network and each of them is associated with a decoupled dynamic system (4) Each player uses his own AR-RHC with horizon . The notations in the previous sections can be defined analogously for each player and the notations of player will be indexed by .
By (3), we associate player with the following cost function:
where is the security investment of player , is a weight on the security cost the and is the vector with ones. The non-negative real value represents the security level given the investment vector of all players, where is convex, non-decreasing, and smooth. We assume that each player has a fixed computational power, and so is fixed. The players need to make the investment such that (6) Remark 3.1: Note that is an integer in (3). In (5) and (6), we use the real value of as an approximation. We now compute the first-order partial derivative of as follows:
where we use the shorthand . Recall that and is non-decreasing and convex. We further derive the second-order partial derivative and is convex in . Analogously, one can show that is convex in .
1) Competitive Resource Allocation Scenario: Consider a resilience management game, where each player minimizes his cost , subject to the common constraint (6) and his private constraint . Since and are convex in , then the game is a generalized convex game. The distributed algorithms in [31] can be directly utilized to numerically compute a Nash equilibrium of the resilience management game, and the algorithms in [31] are able to tolerate transmission delays and packet dropouts.
Remark 3.2: The paper [3] considers a set of identical and independent networked control systems and each of them aims to solve an infinite-horizon LQG problem. The authors study a different security game where the decisions of each player are binary, participating in the security investment or not.
2) Cooperative Resource Allocation Scenario: Consider a resilience management optimization problem, where the players aim to collectively minimize , subject to the global constraint (6) and the private constraint . Since and are convex, then the problem is a convex program. The distributed algorithms in [34] can be directly exploited to numerically compute a global minimizer of this problem, and the algorithms in [34] are robust to the dynamic changes of inter-player topologies.
E. Simulations
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the performance of our algorithm. The set of system parameters are given as follows: One can see that a larger induces a longer time to converge, and larger oscillation before reaching the equilibrium. In our simulations, a smaller horizon than the one determined theoretically is already sufficient to achieve system stabilization.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this technical note, we have studied a resilient control problem where a linear dynamic system is subject to the replay and DoS attacks. We have proposed a variation of the receding-horizon control law for the operator and analyzed system stability and performance degradation. We have also studied a class of competitive (resp. cooperative) resource allocation problems for resilient networked control systems. Extensions to multi-agent systems will be considered in the future.
